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ABSTRACT
Baird, Isabelle Catherine. M.S.I.H.E., Department of Biomedical, Industrial and Human Factors
Engineering, Wright State University, 2019. The development of the human-automation
behavioral interaction task (HABIT) analysis framework.

Complex systems involve the collaboration of automated agents and goal-oriented human
operators in a dynamic environment, and dynamic environments required dynamic automation.
The implementation of automation fundamentally changes the nature of the cognitive demands by
means of changing the role of the human operator. The augmentation of operator situation
awareness has become a major design objective in the development of human-automated systems.
Extensive literature identified the out-of-the-loop performance problem as a human-automation
interaction challenge. This thesis presents the Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task
(HABIT) Analysis, as a novel approach to assessing human-automation interaction challenges,
such as out-of-the-loop consequences. The novel framework considers the drivers of system
performance in terms of cognitive activity and human behavior.
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1.0 Introduction
As technology and computers progress, more and more manual control tasks are being
replaced by automation. For example, airplanes have autopilots to maintain a steady altitude and
flight path; some cars can now park themselves, and some even drive themselves. But what
happens when the automations systems fail due to an electrical failure, a sensor failure, or a
computer software problem that only appears under a rare set of circumstances? A dramatic
recent example is the sensor failure and software problems in the recent Boeing 737 accidents
(Beech & Suhartono, 2019).
It is imperative that system designers design for a human who may be “out of practice” or
has never encountered a particular problem. Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to develop an
analysis framework addressing out-of-the-loop performance consequences: for example,
impaired situation awareness and/or over-trust in computer controllers can affect the human
operator’s ability to recognize system state changes and promptly intervene.
This framework, Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task (HABIT) analysis, is
intended to guide the modeling of cognitive activity to identify potential causes of human error.
The foundation of the framework is based on established Human Factors techniques, including
the Skill, Rule, Knowledge Based Classification System (Rasmussen, 1983), the Generic Error
Modeling System (Reason, 1990), and Cognitive Task Analysis (Vincente, 1999). Limitations of
human cognitive control associated with the cognitive demands of respective cognitive activities
are annotated to predict human error with human-automation interaction (HAI). System
designers can use HABIT to assess human-automation interaction before a system is fielded, to
proactively address and ameliorate problems.
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Section 1.0 introduces the key components, paradigms, and challenges that establish the
need for the HABIT analysis. Section 2.0 presents a literature review of central constructs related
to the out-of-the-loop (OOTL) performance problem, including human-automation teaming
applications, function allocation schemes, shared decision-making, as well as the humanautomation interaction challenges and tradeoffs, and the Human Factors techniques designed to
mitigate them. The design process of the HABIT analysis is presented in Section 3.0. Following
the design methodology, two use cases are introduced and analyzed for validation purposes. A
vigilance task is examined in Section 4.0 and a multi-tasking operation is examined in Section
5.0. Finally, findings, limitations, and future work are discussed in Section 6.0.

1.1 Background

Complex systems involve the collaboration of automated agents and goal-oriented human
operators in a dynamic environment, and dynamic environments required dynamic automation.
New forms of automation introduce new challenges for coordination among the human and
automation (Woods, 1996). Many of these challenges that surface by way of HAI arise as a result
of a designer’s inappropriate expectations for the automated agent and/or human operator
(Billings, 1991). The implementation of automation fundamentally changes the nature of the
cognitive demands by means of changing the role of the human operator. For example, automation
changes a psychomotor task into a sequence of discrete cognitive tasks, which requires more
conscious attention intermittently, as compared with continuous manual control, which generally
requires less attention over an extended period. Deviation from the human operators’ once standard
process of interacting with the system can impair the humans’ cognitive processes (Sarter &
Woods, 1994, 1995; Woods, 1996; Lee & See, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Vincente, 1999)
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and potentially lead to erroneous behavior (Reason, 1990). Erroneous human behavior is often
associated with failures; though, many erroneous human behaviors have predictable cognitive
causes (Reason, 1990).
Extensive findings suggest that human operators do not function well in the supervisory
control and monitoring of automated systems (Hancock, 2014; Onnasch, Wickens, Li, & Manzey,
2014; Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 2007). Human supervisory control (HSC) and monitoring of
automated systems are classified as out-of-the-loop (OOTL) performance tasks. Whether the
operator’s input is to decide if process control intervention is needed, identify a critical system
event, or accept or reject the actions of an automated agent, he or she is removed from the control
loop, thus needs time to intervene and recover awareness of the system state prior to providing
input. These setbacks related to shifts in task demands stemming from automation have
collectively defined as the OOTL performance problem: the impaired ability of the human operator
to manage an automated system in the event of an automation failure or malfunction (Metzger &
Parasuraman, 2005; Moray, 1986; Wickens & Kessel, 1979; Kessel & Wickens, 1982; Wiener &
Curry, 1980).
The design of level of automation (LOA) taxonomies was an approach to mitigate OOTL
performance problems, by means of determining the ‘optimal’ allocation of control between the
human and automated agent (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). Parasuraman and colleagues (2000)
presented a taxonomy aligning the elements of information processing and the functions for
automation, in which four types of automation were defined: action automation, decision
automation, analysis automation, and acquisition automation. Each form can be automated to
different degrees, which posed the question: to what degree do we automate these?
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Extensive research shows that the effect of automation on cognition varies depending on
the function to which it is applied (Ensley & Kaber, 1999; Kaber, Onal, & Endsley, 2017).
Specific attention is paid to automation strategies for decision-making and action automation, as
these stages incorporate higher levels of cognitive processing. Automation that aids decisionmaking has proven to be especially problematic due to a decision-biasing effect (Crocoll &
Coury, 1990; Endsley, Bolte, & Jones, 2003; Sarter & Schroeder, 2001). A number of factors
play into the decision-biasing effect including the trust in automation (Layton, Smith, & McCoy,
1994; Olson & Sarter, 1999), reliability of the automation (Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005;
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman, 2007), and the formation of decision advice (Endsley & Kiris,
1994; Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Pritchett & Hansman, 1997). Studies indicate that the agent(s)
involved in generating the options or course of actions to consider in the decision significantly
affect the human operators’ awareness (Kaber et al., 2000; Kaber & Endsley, 2004). Situation
awareness and OOTL performance problems are also worse with decision automation as
compared to manual performance (Kaber et al., 2000; Kaber & Endsley, 2004; Onnasch, et al.,
2014).
The application of automation is widespread across a variety of domains. From a human
factors’ perspective, no domain is superior in terms of the design of automated system. Different
industries have unique approaches to system design referring to how they achieve an ‘optimal’
LOA, allocate tasks and functions, and interface automated technology. This research concentrates
on the evaluation of complex decision-making tasks in which decision-automation often applied.
The following properties characterize an applicable system or task:
a) Multiple or dynamic task(s) competing for an operator’s attention, each with
different bearing to system goals,
4

b) Performance of the respective system requires intermittent or continuous vigilance,
c) Performance of the respective system relies on the collaboration of human and
automated agents.
The foundation of HABIT is based on telling Human Factors empirical findings concerning
HAI challenges due to poor design decisions. Numerous HAI analysis techniques and design tools
have been developed as an attempt to address HAI problems. Yet, many of these techniques omit
some aspect of human cognition and can miss potentially damaging interactions.
The proposed framework aims to address the following questions recurring in the literature
on the design of these complex systems via a novel approach.
a) How can one allocate decision tasks between agents?
b) What is an ideal combination of human and artificial agents in a cognitive system?
c) What is an effective decision aid?
d) What is useful feedback?
HABIT takes a Human Factors and Cognitive Engineering approach to addressing the
defined queries by means of conceptually modeling these three research questions:
1) What influences how the human perceives the automated aid automated aid?
2) What cognitive activities affect human performance?
3) How does the human interact with the automated aid?
The three questions posed above all result in the implementation of an action. Rasmussen’s (1983)
Skill, Rule, Knowledge classification offers insight on what an action is based. Incorporating

5

Rasmussen’s broad distinction between behaviors address each of the three posed research
questions.
The justification as well as validation of the novel approach is defined in a five-stage, dualphase research framework. Figure 1 outlines the development of the proposed research framework
developed. The development of the proposed work is addressed in phase 1. Phase 2 outlines the
application of the framework in terms of conducting the analysis and interpreting results. The five
stages are 1) Knowledge Acquisition, 2) Define Scheme, 3) Model Procedure, 4) Evaluation, and
5) Validation.

Figure 1 Research framework
6

To effectively capture the damaging interactions in HAI, the proposed framework attempts
to reveal the inappropriate expectations for human operators by way of a behavioral evaluation of
the task functions. The functionality of HABIT is comparable to that of Human Factors techniques
that use cognitive modeling to simulate erroneous human behaviors in an attempt to evaluate these
actions. The HABIT framework proposes a hands-on approach by way of cognitive function
modeling and annotation to elicit insight on human error.
This research aims to develop and validate a human-centered approach to assess the design of
human-automation systems. The success of a human-automated system is contingent on the
solidarity among the human and automated agent. The novel framework considers the drivers of
system performance in terms of cognitive activity and human behavior. The diagram presented in
Figure 2 introduces the principal concepts motivating the development of the proposed framework.

Figure 2 Principal concepts in the development of the HABIT framework.

OOTL problems arise as a result of impaired situation awareness (Endsley, 2017). The
proposed framework intends to assess the human-automated system’s susceptibility to OOTL
consequences by way of assessing potential mismatches in terms of the cognitive activities the
human operator is allocated and the cognitive relief (or lack of) the automated aid offers.
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Mismatches between responsibility and authority entails potential concern with trust, reliance, and
monitoring (Pritchett, Kim, & Feigh, 2013). This construct can result in several adverse
outcomes— one being the requirement for humans to adopt a passive role. To validate HABIT,
two Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tasks serve as use cases: a multi-UAV
control and surveillance task, requiring multi-attentional control; and a data-truthing task,
requiring extensive periods of vigilance.
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2.0 Literature Review
This thesis explores the factors introduced in the preceding figure by means of exploring
prevailing paradigms in the automation domain. The scope of the research focuses on studying
and understanding pertinent HAI paradigms in addition to how they came to be. Literature on the
functions and degrees of autonomy and intervention served as a guide in understanding how
automation affects human cognition and performance. Parasuraman and colleagues (2000)
defined four types of automation in which can be automated to different degrees, posing the
question: How much do we automate these? In view of the HAI related findings via Human
Factors research in which different LOAs were applied to different tasks in different ways (static
or flexible), a trend is anticipated in the application of dynamic or intermediate LOAs as a result
of a gradual progression of system control. Despite these assumptions, Human Factors principles
indicate that some degree of HAI will continue to be necessary as a human nor machine
comprises the robustness to perform optimally on their own. A successful human-automated
system design creates a conceptual space in which human and automated agents are mutually
represented. This work aims to incorporate the following principle:
“Do not devalue the human in order to justify the machine. Do not criticize the machine
in order to rationalize the human. Advocate the human-machine system in order to
amplify both” (Hoffman, Feltovich P., Ford, Woods, Klein, & Feltovich A., 2002)

2.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
ISR missions are essential to military operations in the Department of Defense, by means
of satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used to gather valuable information from a
combination of sensors and human operators. The objective of ISR is to provide actionable
9

knowledge to decision-makers about a specified target area and/or target. Information is most
valuable when it contributes to or shapes the respective decision by providing reasoned insight
into future conditions of situations (Poeppelman, Caggiano, Jackson, Galster, Tossell, Bolley,
Scarff, Lind, Durkee, & Wiggins, 2013). Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) serve as
intelligence requirements and drive the planning, decision, and identification of targets in ISR
missions. Intelligence is the product of the collection, processing, integration, evaluation and
interpretation of available information involving foreign environments (Ventre, 2011).
Intelligence can be collected in multiple ways, such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT), in which
a person directly observing the target; or Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), derived from photographs
and other imagery (Barber 2001; United States Air Force, 2012). Surveillance is the continuous
systematic search of an area of interest, generally for a specific target defined by EEIs.
ISR missions are especially difficult due to attempts by perpetrators to hide their activity,
and the combination of long periods of low activity and occasional period of high demand, and
complex activity involving multiple perpetrators. Adding to these perceptual and cognitive
demands on the analysts are long observation sessions that increase fatigue and workload.
Hence, the desire to augment ISR analysts via computer-based aiding. Automated aids are
implemented at all levels of ISR operations. Automation is often integrated into ISR missions to
alleviate operator workload and reduce error, as errors can have a detrimental effect on
performance in time-critical operations. The effort to reduce workload in ISR operations yielded
an increase of monitoring tasks that require operator multi-tasking. For example, the singleoperator-multiple UAV paradigm requires the human operator to supervise the activity of
multiple UAVs.
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2.1.1 Human + Automation Teaming in ISR Operations
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UAVs have become imperative assets to ISR operations. They are small, remote piloted
machines equipped with sensing, analyzing, communicating, planning and decision-making
abilities used for real-time monitoring. UAVs contain computer-based companion systems that
incorporate varying levels of autonomy and dynamic function allocation as basic operating
principles (Reisling, 2003). All UAVs in the Department of Defense inventory operate at some
level of supervisory control (Cummings et al., 2007). Human supervisory control is the process
by which a human operator intermittently interacts with a computer, receives feedback from and
provides commands to a controlled process or task environment (Sheridan, 1992). Human
supervisory control in UAV operation is a hierarchical process comprised of four major loops:
(1) control; (2) navigation; (3) mission and payload management; and (4) system health and
status monitoring (Cummings et al, 2007).
In controlling multiple UAVs, the human operator generally performs higher levels of
planning and decision-making and remote operations tasks related to overall mission, and
delegates motion and control tasks to automation (i.e., autopilot) (Cummings et a., 2007).
Multiple UAVs operate as distributed processing systems, proficient in path planning, collision
avoidance, and coordination (Shakhatreh, Sawalmeh, Al-Fuqaha, Dou, Almaita, Khalil, &
Guizani, 2018). Path planning algorithms and collision avoidance technologies offer relief to the
human operator during navigation-based tasks (Harman, 1989). Dixon and Wickens (2003)
found that allocation of routine piloting to an automated agent freed attentional resources and
improved performance on a concurrent visual target and system fault-detection tasks.
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These cases are representative of decentralized control with the human operator as a
supervisor, in which each vehicle has control over its own mission and shares data with nearby
UAVs. In case of a system failure or disruption, the human operator is brought back into the
loop, perhaps notified by means of an auditory alert. Research has indicated that automated-aid
in the form of feedback (i.e., system status alerts), has greatly increased the speed-accuracy
trade-off when controlling more than one UAV (Calhoun, Draper, Ruff, & Fontejon, 2002;
Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, 2003; Muller & Narayanan, 2009). Calhoun and colleagues (2002),
and Dixon and colleagues (2003) tested the value of tactile and auditory displays, separately, as a
tactic of alerting operators to system failures. In these studies system failures were detected more
quickly when signaled through tactile or auditory displays than when indicated visually. This
may be related to recall, as pilots of manned aircrafts are alerted to disturbances by multiple
forms of sensory feedback (i.e., visual, auditory, and haptic).
Recovering from a system failure can be challenging for a human operator, as they may
have no knowledge of the system status. Especially in these cases, as the human operator is
located in an entirely different location than the automated vehicle. Thus, the operator could
unknowingly take actions that may further damage the operation. In different circumstances in
which the operator is provided high-priority information in terms of indicator(s) of the failure, a
timely recovery is more probable.
Human-in-the-Loop Data-truthing
Automation performs a task. Machine Learning (ML) takes this a step further, identifying
relevant patterns in data and utilizing them in prediction. ML provides a system with the
capability to independently analyze data, develop, and execute predictive models, and evaluate
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model fit, and is updatable with new data samples (Mangos & Hulse, 2017). Problem solving via
ML involves the utilization of statistical concepts to construct a mathematical model used to
make predictions from a sample of target data (Mangos & Hulse, 2017). This tactic is valuable in
the data processing and analysis phases of the ISR process. Despite advancements in computervision research, human analysts must process the majority of imagery data collected (Nickels,
2014; Bryant, Johnson, Kent, Nowak, & Rogers, 2008). These human analysts are known as,
image analysts (IAs).
Data-truthing is a significant component of ML. Data-truthing is the process in which the
data collected is labelled based on specified parameters. Analysts must detect and analyze targets
from full motion imagery. Analysis of full motion imagery can push the limits of human
information processing abilities in which errors can easily be made (Rodgers, 2006). An IA
truths data over an extensive period, which strains the vigilance and morale of analysts. Human
performance tends to drop in sustained attention tasks over time. This is known as the vigilance
decrement.
A method referred to as human-in-the-loop (HITL) Machine Learning (ML) is applied to
data-truthing to improve the efficiency of the process. The actions performed by the analyst
comprise a continuous feedback loop. Within the ML system, the truthing tasks are fed back into
the algorithm to increase intelligence, confidence, and accuracy. Injecting data back into the
algorithm is often referred to as active learning (CrowdFlower, 2018). Human input initially
occurs when the user tags the original dataset that feeds into the machine-learning model, and
again when the user assists in correcting inaccurate predictions that surface as the system runs in
real-time. The HITL ML process is demonstrated in Figure 3.
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The analyst’s performance is the foundation of the HITL approach. The model uses
active learning to correct itself from classifications previously missed. Hence, with every
iteration, the classification model becomes more familiar with the task behavior. The overall

Figure 3 The HITL ML process utilizes active learning via human
annotation to train ML algorithms to recognize specified targets.

effectiveness of the process is dependent on the user’s performance-quality in truthing the data;
thus, the human is the origin of system success or failure.
In familiarizing the system with the specified task behavior, the knowledge-based system
is equipped to detect anomalies efficiently and effectively. Anomaly detection refers to the
problem of finding patterns in data that do not conform to expected behavior (Chandola, 2017).
Yerkes-Dodson law states that human vigilance tends to drop when monitoring for low
probability events, such as anomalies. As the consequence of anomalies can be devastating, it is
critical that real-time anomaly detection be improved. HITL ML aligns with the declaration that
functions should not be allocated explicitly to the human or computer; rather, tasks should be
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designed so that the interaction between the cognitive agents supports a supplemental
relationship in reaching the desired goal. The HITL approach utilizes the computers’ ability to
perform quick, logical reasoning in real-time by means of continuous training in which the
human’s ability to recognize complex objects and make knowledge-based inferences is
favorable. In aggregate, the HITL ML technique mitigates the high cognitive demands by
removing the time-critical aspect from anomaly detection.

2.2 Function Allocation and the Degree of Autonomy and Intervention
Function allocation is the design decision to assign task functions between agents, both
human and automated. This design decision considers the task work required to act upon the task
environment in such a manner to generate and maintain the desired conditions for operation
performance (Pritchett et al., 2013). In literature, three common principles of function allocation
include leftover (Bailey 1982), compensatory, and the complementary principle (Hollnagel &
Woods, 2005; Grote, Walter, Windischer, & Weik, 2000). The leftover principle is the most
common approach for function allocation (Andersson, 2011). This strategy automates as many
functions as computer-based technology will permit and assumes the human operator will
perform the remaining functions. Whereas this approach may attempt to reduce operator
workload altogether, numerous adverse may ensue as a result of removing the human operator
from the control loop.
While there is no standard method for defining function allocation, requirements have
been established based on the problem areas in HAI. The following requirements guide of an
effective approach to function allocation (Bradshaw, Feltovich, & Johnson, 2011):
a) Each agent must be allocated function that it can perform.
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b) Each agent must be capable of performing its collective set of functions.
c) Function allocation must be achievable with reasonable collaboration.
d) Function allocation must support the dynamics of the task.
e) Function allocation should be the result of deliberate design decisions.
Human performance and task measures provide insight to system designs regarding potential
tradeoffs with respect to design decisions. For instance, the effort and dynamics of an UAV
supervisory control task of multiple UAVs can reveal a tradeoff among sensor operator
navigation efforts by allocating more functions to the automated system, at the expense of extra
monitoring and potential degradation of the sensor operators’ ability to foresee upcoming actions
as a result of a loss of situation awareness.
LOA differs from alternative approaches to function allocation because LOA allocates
system functions based on consideration of the competencies of each agent under normal
operating conditions and failure modes. LOA addresses role allocation via the introduction of
taxonomies that classify HAI schemes.
2.2.1 Level of Automation
The LOA scales generally represent a continuum that varies between full operator
autonomy and full-computer autonomy. The appropriateness of the degree of autonomy if
different for different problem contexts and processes of complex systems. Parasuraman and
colleagues (2000) emphasized how the appropriate LOA differs at the four informationprocessing stages for different applications. The initial LOA taxonomy proposed (Sheridan and
Verplank, 1978) was comprised of a 10-point scale designed to designate who (the human or
computer) has control in terms of decision or action selection. In time, the concept expanded,

16

resulting in an array of versions developed at different levels of abstraction (Endlsey, 1987;
Kaber & Endsley, 1999, 2004; Parasuraman et al., 2000; Cummings et al., 2007). Endsley and
Kaber (1999) developed a 10-level taxonomy representative of the use of expert systems to
supplement human decision-making in cognitive and dynamic control tasks where system
feedback is essential to overall performance. This framework recognizes multiple function
allocation arrangements by assigning task functions to the human or computer, or a combination
of the two, based on sensing and processing capabilities. The allocations illustrate how the four
generic functions for allocation (Endsley, 1987) being, monitoring, generating, selecting, and
implementing can be assigned. The function allocation for the defined roles are summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1 Endsley & Kaber (1999) function allocation framework summarized

Each LOA taxonomy delivers a wide range of design options. With respect to
applicability, some levels can be merged to form four distinct levels of autonomy (Cummings et
al., 2007).
1) Fully manual
2) Management-by-consent, in which automation as an assistant to the operator
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3) Management-by-exceptions, where automation decides to execute an action based
on pre-determined criteria, and only gives human operator a chance to veto the
decision
4) Autonomous control
The design of LOA taxonomies laid a foundation for the allocation of functions in human
automated systems. Advancements in the design of HAS encourage the transition from discrete
function allocation to a cohesive joint effort (Miller & Parasuraman, 2007; Cummings, 2014).
2.2.2 Human-Centered Approach to Levels of Automation
The perplexing human factors issue of function allocation has typically been based on
conventional characteristics of human and computer capabilities and capacities, and has offered
negligible success (McCarthy, Fallon, & Bannon, 2000; Jordan, 1963; Sheridan, 1998). Flexible
automation that is context dependent, relative to situational demands during operation, was
proposed as an attempt to better incorporate LOAs into system design (Hancock, Chignell, &
Lowenthal, 1985). For example, if performance is decreasing in a higher LOA, the flexible
automation may shift to a lower level or designate more control to the human operator.
Oppermann (1994) characterized two flexible automation schemes:
1) Adaptable automation, where the human controls the automation’s operation; and,
2) Adaptive automation, where the system automatically adjusts the LOA based on
the context of the scenario.
Dynamic allocation of control between a human operator and automation overtime may improve
human performance as part of complex systems operations by means of avoiding OOTL
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performance and ensuring automated support is ideal given the operators’ momentary status
(Scerbo, 2001; Inagaki, 2003; Miller & Parasuraman, 2007).
This concept has generated an assortment of schemes to allocate the workload of
dynamic tasks. For example, an aerial vehicle under normal conditions awaiting operator
approval for new trajectories could resort to management-by-exception under high cognitive load
conditions such that the automated system takes a more active role in generating or executing
decisions unless vetoed by the human operator. Dynamic allocation would ensure that the
operator’s high workload would not affect the vehicle’s ability to achieve the goal. Despite the
functionality and potential benefits of flexible automation, these tactics are not effective unless
the human operator accepts the system (Crandall & Cummings, 2008).
In adaptive automation, shifts in LOA are system-driven; thus, the human may perceive
the shifts in mode as a source of unpredictability rather than aid (Billings, 1997). Systematic
changes is operating modes can appear as automation failures and lead to confusion in response
(Sebok & Wickens, 2016). Adaptive automation minimizes the operators’ control and can impair
situation awareness, potentially resulting in inappropriate trust in the automation. Adaptable
automation retains the human’s decision authority in addition to maintaining operator situation
awareness. The operator delegates the role of automation, resulting in automated actions that
better align with operator expectations and mental model, supporting operator situation
awareness.
An effective approach to human-centric HAI must support human performance and
cognitive processes, as well as maintain acceptable human workload levels in system control. A
study comprised of a multi-UAV control task found that while adaptable automation increased
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workload, it also improved change detection, in addition to increasing operator confidence in
task-related decision-making (Kidwell, Calhoun, Ruff, & Parasuraman, 2012). Ultimately, the
adaptable automation approach is human-centric in that it:
a) Provides the human operator with more authority in addition to allowing the user
to collaborate with automation across a range of levels (Miller & Parasuraman,
2007).
b) Mitigates frustration, stress, and a lack of user-acceptance by satisfying the
human operator’s desire to be in control (Miller, 1999; Vicente, 1999).

2.3 Decision-Making and Action Automation: Human + Automation Pairing
Humans have typically maintained cognitive functions, such as decision-making. The
evolution of automation has led to a gradual integration of cognitive functions to automated aids
in the effort to reduce human error. Advanced decision automation integrates automated
decision-making without human intervention, in which decisions are translated into action
quickly. This notion is best suited for highly structured decision criteria based on high-quality
electronic data; thus, not applicable for complex or dynamic environments.
Automated decision aids can be applied at varying levels of autonomy or augmentation
(Parasuraman et al., 2000). Depending on the degree of autonomy, the system may not simply
augment the human operator but rather replace human selection of decision options with
automated decision-making. Hence, the introduction of an automated aid can complicate the
allocation of functions for decisions, as patterns of feedback frequency and the way scenarios are
evaluated and managed change.
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2.3.1 Types of Decision-Making
A decision is the by-product of alternatives. Intelligence, in terms of awareness or
information, is the foundation of decision-making, by means of (Orasanu, 2010):
1) Identifying situations that require decisions to be made,
2) Assessing the type and risks of problem present,
3) Determining what information is relevant to the decision, and
4) Deciding on an appropriate course of action.
Problems differ with respect to the number of options and the form of response necessary. Table
2 outlines the component of decision-making based on the established theories (Rasmussen,
1983; Klein, 1993; Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson., 1987; Lipchitz, 1993)
Table 2: Elements of types of decision-making
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The cognitive demands required for the different types of decisions outlined in Table 1,
in some instances are better suited for automated decision-making than human decision-making,
and vice versa. Figure 4 summarizes the decision-making allocation between humans and
automation.

Figure 4 Decision allocation of human and automation adapted from
Cummings, How, Whitten, and Toupet (2012)

The concept of shared decision-making is an approach to augment human decisionmaking by means of an efficient, high-performing team, maximizing the benefits of excess
cognitive and perceptual capacity in the decision-making process.
2.3.2 Shared Decision-Making
Complex tasks with high cognitive demands lend themselves to automated decision aids
(ADAs). The objective is to supplement human cognitive processing by way of forming a
symbiotic relationship, in which the strength of one agent offsets the limitations of the other
(Licklider, 1960; Chen & Barnes, 2014). Without careful consideration, delegating to automation
may have the consequence of impairing human decision maker’s vigilance, increasing the
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likelihood of not noticing anomalous events that are not explicitly brought to the operator’s
attention (Mosier & Skitka, 1996). Figure 5 is an abstract representation intended to provide an
indication of the factors and interactions that play into human-computer pairing.

Figure 5 Characteristics of human-automation shared decision-making adapted from Barnes,
Chen, and Hill (2017)

In instances where the operator and automated system share control, communication and
coordination is critical (Degani & Heyman, 2002). The absence of critical information from or
about the system gradually removes the human operator from the loop, in which is often
followed by OOTL performance.
2.3.3 Challenges
Humans have the tendency to introduce cognitive bias by means of cognitive heuristics,
in addition to having been prone to years of acquired assumptions that can affect the respective
task. Heuristics are simple decision-making rules humans often used to make inferences or to
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draw conclusions quickly and simply. The use of inappropriate heuristics (i.e., not guided by
training, experience, or expert knowledge) has revealed numerous cognitive biases,
representative of errors in judgment and decision-making (Mosier & Skitska, 1996).
The notion that humans are apt to using minimal cognitive effort (Fiske & Taylor, 1991)
by means of accepting an available option as adequate or exerting just enough cognitive effort to
make reasonably acceptable decisions, results in automation bias (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010;
Rice & McCarley, 2011),. Information-cuing and -filtering systems are both subject to decision
biasing effects as the automated systems limits information presented to the human operator to
some degree (Yeh, Wickens, & Seagull, 1999). Decision aids that make recommendations or
offer alternatives may slow down the human in that in that they may take time to contemplate
what information they agree with (Endsley & Kiris, 1994; Pritchett & Hansman, 1997).
Automation bias occurs when human decision makers fail to acknowledge problems by
cause of an omission error, in which the automation fails to support the human; or a commission
error, in which incorrect support is offered to the human. When automation is incorrect, human
operators perform worse than if they had received no decision advice at all (Layton, Smith, &
McCoy, 1994; Olson & Sarter, 1999). Omission errors often occur in highly automated
environments because of OOTL performance consequences such as complacency, loss of
situation awareness, and a vigilance decrement. Commission errors often transpire as a result of
overreliance (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
According to Rice and McCarley (2011), performance of the human-automation system
is determined by three factors:
1) The operators unaided performance level,
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2) The aid’s reliability, and
3) The operator’s utilization of the aid, or tendency to act on the aid’s
recommendations.
Humans are more likely to use a reliable automated aid than an unreliable aid. Although,
inappropriate reliance can lead to improper use in the form of automation disuse, misuse, or
abuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Misuse can be disastrous in that, in the absence of system
feedback the human operator generally assumes that the system is running smoothly, despite the
present activity (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005). Disuse, often derived from underutilization can
cause users to ignore critical information presented by the automated system (Parasuraman &
Riley, 1997). When humans perceive automated systems as team members, their attitudes of
misuse or disuse develop as they become familiar with the system, indicating that operator
reliance is dependent on the human’s attitude towards automated systems (Chen & Barnes,
2014).
In the case of human-automation shared decision-making, the underlying knowledge
models (i.e., mental model, task model, domain model) may be different from one another. To
ensure both agents are mutually understood, system transparency and communication is critical
(Morrow & Fiore, 2013). Decision support should be provided to the human operator by way of

informative insight that simplifies the decision-making process for the decision maker.

2.4 Human-Automation Interaction
The appropriate application of automation has the potential to:
a) Provide a more balanced mental workload and increase user acceptance (Miller &
Parasuraman, 2007).
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b) Maintain the appropriate human involvement and task load to reduce vulnerability
to OOTL consequences by considering human and automation performance
abilities during failures (Morrow & Fiore, 2013; Kaber & Endsley, 2004; Kaber &
Endsley, 1997).
c) Reduce system error due to poor automated decision-making by relying on human
decision-making capabilities (Kaber & Endsley, 1997).
d) Enhance system performance through applying the appropriate level of
automation (Kaber & Endsley, 1997).
e) Increase efficiency, improve safety, and enhance the flexibility of operations
(Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).
In seeking the benefits of automation, the costs by way of human performance problems
are made evident by means of poor system design. Humans are increasingly assuming
supervisory roles over automation and in turn are often allocated multi-attentional cognitive
tasks. Humans cannot multi-task well (Madni, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Sebok & Wickens, 2016). As
a result of multi-attentional task demands, the human operator is unable to pay full attention to
each task or recall all the information presented to them, making the operator susceptible to
erroneous behavior (Madni, 2010). This consideration is integral when humans return from being
OOTL by cause of an event of a failure or disturbance. In this instance, it is unlikely a human
operator can effectively address and resolve a system failure with his or her attention divided on
multiple tasks (Endsley, 1995; Madni, 2011a, 2011b; Sebok & Wickens, 2016). This notion
introduces two challenges:
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1) How does one keep the human adequately engaged so the human operator has
sufficient knowledge on the system states and parameters to be effective in
resolving a problem or disturbance?
2) What is the best way to introduce the human back into the system?
Figure 6 frames the potential tradeoffs of the defined challenges.

Figure 6 Tradeoffs in managing OOTL performance

An operator cannot work effectively without situation awareness. Ideally, information
is presented systematically to the human. In this regard, it is important to consider what the
critical information is that the operator must know first, before any decision or action can be
taken (Ordoukhanian & Madni, 2017). This high-priority information must be communicated
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promptly to the operator to ensure maximum situation awareness on the manifestation of the
present problem.
Human Factors principles support that humans must play a role in complex systems for
either regulatory requirements or low probability event intervention (Cummings, 2014). The
notion that human input is necessary implies that the introduction of automation into a system
does not call for the removal of the human operator, rather the effective integration of systematic
feedback to ensure a high level of continuous situation awareness for the human operator. A
system may provide this via abundant and dynamic information that is efficiently visualized
(Endsley & Robertson, 2000). Visualization must support the development of mental models,
automation of actions, and pattern recognition (Endsley & Robertson, 2000). The goal in HAI
is not to determine which tasks are better suited for the human or automation, but how tasks can
be accomplished via a joint effort. (Bradshaw et al., 2011). Human Factors principles suggest a
human-automated system should be designed to:
a) Function in predictable ways to support the human operator’s mental model of
the system (Billings, 1997; Endsley et al., 2003);
b) Retain the human operator in control loops with meaningful tasks they are
capable of performing (Kaber & Endsley, 2004);
c) Ensure that automation does not leave the human with a fragmented and difficult
job (Billings, 1997); and
d) Provide the human operator adequate feedback on the state of the system
(Billings, 1997; Ordoukhanian & Madni, 2017).
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Nevertheless, the prevailing perspective is to maximize automation and consequently
minimize human interaction (i.e., leftover principle). A high level of automation in decision
selection and action can be justified in time-critical settings, as the operators’ reaction time may
be too slow. Allocating the decision selection and action functions to the automated system may
impair the human operators’ ability to maintain sufficient awareness of the system.
Performance problems in HAI are derived from the misconception of the cognitive agents
in the system (Billings 1991) in terms of human cognition and function allocation (Billings,
1997; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman et al., 2000; Rasmussen, 1983; Sheridan, 1992;
Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008; Wiener & Curry, 1980). In order to provide
applicable design recommendations and theory on how to design for effective HAI and system
performance, understanding the effects of automation on human cognition and performance is
essential. As performance is generally contingent on the accuracy and efficiency of an operation,
erroneous action is unfavorable. According to Leveson (2011, p. 273),
“Human error is not random. It results from basic human mental abilities and physical
skills combined with the features of the tools being used, the tasks assigned, and the
operating environment.”
The following sections will discuss the criticality of human cognition and inappropriate function
allocation concerning overall HAI and system performance.
2.4.2 Cognitive Variables and Trade-off Space
Workload, situation awareness, and trust are the primary human performance
considerations. Workload is defined as the attentional and cognitive ‘energy’ the human must
exert to interact with the system (Wickens & Hollands, 2000; Parasuraman & Hancock, 2001).
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The amount of workload is influenced by multiple factors related to the LOA of the automated
agent and the task demands. The distribution of cognitive demands, whether too high or low, can
degrade the operators’ ability to respond effectively to adverse events (Parasuraman et al., 2008).
For instance, too low of workload for a sustained period can impair the operators’ situation
awareness. The operator’s situation awareness represents his or her understanding of the
respective task in terms of the perception of elements in the environment, the comprehension of
their meaning, and the projection of their status in the future (Endsley, 2017). Keeping the
human operator in the loop increases situation awareness by means of providing the user with a
more complete mental model of the system. Loss of situation awareness may result in degraded
performance, skill decay, attributed to OOTL performance. Trust is “the attitude that an agent
will help achieve an individuals’ goals in a situation characterized by reliability and
vulnerability” (Lee & See, 2004, p.54). The human operators trust in automation is a key
contributor to acceptance in many cases, as well as the conviction with which humans will make
decisions based on information presented by the automated agent (Hoffman, Johnson, Bradshaw,
& Underbrink, 2013; McBride & Morgan, 2010). The defined measures and their characteristics
are dependent on one another. The interdependent relationships over a task or function can be
viewed as a trade-off space. Figure 7 illustrates the tradeoffs in human-automation interaction
with respect to human performance measures that are principal elements in the HABIT analysis.
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Figure 7 Cognitive trade-offs in human-automation interaction
that influence how the human operator interacts with the
automated system. Improper interaction can be detrimental to
system performance.

Cognitive elements influence how the human perceives the system, how the human
interacts with the system, and how the human thinks. In effect, how the human perceives the
system and how the human thinks independently influence how the human interacts with the
system. If the human operator perceives the system to be reliable he or she is more prone to
trusting and potentially moreover accepting the automated agent. While it is important to
maintain user trust, it is also important to ensure that the human does not over trust the system,
causing overreliance and complacency (Lee & See, 2004). The degree of reliance and
complacency influences how the human interacts with the system. Inappropriate reliance can
lead to “improper use”, in the form of automation disuse, misuse, or abuse (Parasuraman &
Riley, 1997). Misuse, often derived from overreliance, can lead to complacency resulting in a
lack of vigilance (Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2005; Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). Human
complacency behaviors are linked to insufficient attention and incomplete verification, and
inattentive processing of inconsistent information (Manzey, Reichenbach, & Onnasch, 2012).
Compounding issues of vigilance and complacency can decrease attention allocation to critical
information because of improper trust in automation (Moray, 2003; Lee & See, 2004; Hergeth,
Lorenz, Vilimek, & Krems, 2016). Disuse often derived from underutilization or lack of trust can
31

cause users to ignore critical information presented by the automated system, causing accidents
to occur (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Effective system performance requires the human
operator to learn appropriate levels of trust based on the performance of the automated system
with which they are interacting (McBride & Morgan, 2010; Hoffman, et al., 2013).
2.4.4 Out-of-the-Loop (OOTL) Performance Problems
OOTL performance develops from the shift from active information processing to
passive information processing. The lack of human input in system control and problem solving,
limits the level of HAI, and consequently impairs operator situation awareness. This poses a
detrimental problem in the instance of a system failure, as operators may be slower to detect
problems and require additional time to reorient themselves to present system parameters to
proceed with problem diagnosis and assume of manual performance when removed from the
control loop (Wickens, 1992). This manifestation is referred to as an OOTL performance
problem and is explained by means of a principal finding in HAI research declared the
automation conundrum:
“The more automation is added to a system and the more reliable and robust that
automation is, the less likely that human operators overseeing the automation will be
aware of critical information and able to take over manual control when needed. More
automation refers to automation use for more functions, longer durations, higher levels of
automation, and automation that encompasses longer task sequences.” (Endsley, 2017, p.
8)
By way of increasing the use of automation, multiple tasks are monitored concurrently
with no need to intervene, imposing higher cognitive demands and risks concerning skill
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degradation, complacency, trust in automation, and OOTL performance problems (Andersson,
2011; Moray, 1986; Wickens, 1992; Wiener & Curry, 1980). According to Endsley and Kaber
(1997), the OOTL performance problem is associated with many harmful consequences related
to operator behavior, such as:
a) Loss of system or situation awareness,
b) Over-trust in computer controllers,
c) Failure to detect system state changes and promptly intervene, and
d) Direct or manual control skill degradation.
High LOAs are most susceptible to OOTL performance problems. For instance, the
implementation of action automation in which a sequence of functions is queued, such as,
navigation algorithms, in which the path is planned; or batch processing, in which many steps in
a process are systematically sequenced in advance, the system is highly susceptible to OOTL
performance problems (Kaber, Onal, & Endsley, 2017). A meta-analysis of studies on LOAs
(Onnash et al., 2014) discovered a lumberjack effect, in which the more automation assists in
manual performance, the worse the performance in recovering from automation failure. This
effect is attributed to the shift from active to passive information processing as well as a change
in feedback provided to the operator (Endsley & Kiris, 1995, Wickens & Hollands, 2000). A
study, assessing human’s ability to recover from automation failures when performing an
automobile navigation task found that OOTL performance consequences decreased and situation
awareness increased when operating under intermediate LOA as compared to full automation
(Endsley & Kiris, 1995). Similar results were observed in a dynamic target detection task, in
which the operator’s time to recovery during automation failures significantly improved with
LOAs requiring human interaction in task implementation (Kaber & Endsley, 1997). Results
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from a study comparing three LOAs in an automated diagnosis system found that under an
automation failure, the decision support tool performed the worst (Lorenz, Di Nocera, Röttger, &
Parasuraman, 2001). According to Lorenz et al., (2001), this was due to the lack of information
presented to the user in the operating condition. Intermediate LOAs in which the system only
makes recommendations and the human makes the final decision; or the system makes the
selection and implements it unless the human vetoes, makes minimal difference to OOTL
recovery times. However, the agent(s) involved in generating the options or course of actions to
consider in the decision matter significantly (Kaber et al., 2000; Kaber & Endsley, 2004).
OOTL consequences contribute to the decrement of system effectiveness above a certain
level of automation (Lee, 2006). The point at which the effectiveness of the automation begins to
decline is contingent upon the interaction of the domain characteristics, task demands, quality of
system feedback and the operators’ information processing and problem solving abilities
(Andersson, 2011).

2.5 Human-Automation Interaction Evaluation and Analyses
The inherent variability that accompanies all human performance makes failures in
complex systems difficult to anticipate due to unexpected interaction between elements that
compose the system. The design of HAI has contributed to countless failures across multiple
domains. The following sections introduce modeling techniques, approaches, and analyses
developed that contribute to the exploration and improvement of HAI.
2.5.1 Human Factors Modeling Techniques
As part of the process of analyzing HAI, Human Factors engineers use task analytic
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models to capture the descriptive and normative human operator behavior. Related techniques
such as, cognitive work analysis (Vicente, 1999) and cognitive task analysis (Schraagen et al.,
2000; Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992) guide the design of system interfaces by recognizing system
and environmental information to facilitate human interpretation and the tasks to achieve system
goals. Additional tactics developed to aid in the understanding of human error, human cognitive
processing, problem solving, and decision-making, consist of Human Factor’s modeling
techniques in which provide a degree of insight in terms of human behavior and cognitive
processes. Human factors researchers utilize these methods for both the analysis of human
function and for the development of systems designed for optimal user experience and
interaction (Bolton, Bass, & Siminiceanu, 2013). Cognitive modeling approaches have a distinct
advantage as analysts can deduce the source of erroneous behavior.
The objective of these models is to model the cognitive processes the operator employs to
decide what actions he or she will use to interact with the system. These methods can identify
situations where the human operator fails to achieve desired goals or drives the system into
dangerous operating conditions. The dynamic of these models and the analyses they support are
determined by the cognitive system in which they are introduced.
2.5.2 Cognitive-based Analysis Approach
An assortment of analysis and evaluation techniques have been designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of different HAI systems, in addition to find and/or potentially reduce the
likelihood of HAI related system failures. Cognitive, decision-making, behavioral classifications
and modeling techniques often assist in the analysis of HAI by providing a framework for
manual simulation, or statistically evaluate systems without the need for human subject
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experiments (Curzon & Blandford, 2002). Human-centered analyses utilize conceptual models of
human cognitive processes to evaluate erroneous behaviors related to the following behavior:
a) Repetition of actions
b) Omission of actions
c) Commission of correct actions in the wrong context
d) Replacement of one action with another
e) Performance of one or more actions out of order
f) Performance of unrelated actions
Analysts may use human mental models to analyze HAI by means of finding
discrepancies between the human-system mental model and the automation. Computer-based
approaches of this concept have been developed to show inconsistences in various applications
(Degani & Heymann, 2002). An alternative approach utilizes human knowledge models, as they
are representative of the human operator’s understanding of how he or she accomplishes goals
via interfacing with the system (Bolton et al., 2013). This approach requires that analysts capture
the potentially flawed knowledge the human operator has regarding achieving goals with the
system.
2.5.3 Human Error Identification
An assortment human error identification (HEI) methods are used to recognize potential
errors that may result from human-machine interactions in complex systems (Stanton, Salmon,
Rafferty, Walker, Baber, & Jenkins, 2017). Merging elements from current HEI methods, Task
Analysis for Error Identification (TAFEI) and Cognitive Reliability & Error Analysis Method
(CREAM) offers the ability to break down the task, identify errors, classify the nature of the
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error, and pinpoint areas of improvement.
HEI method, CREAM, is used to predict potential human error, and retrospectively, to
analyze and quantify error (Hollnagel, 1998). CREAM focuses on identifying human error via
analyzing human cognition. In this method, the Contextual Control Model (COCOM) represents
how actions are chosen and assumes that the degree of control that an operator has over his or
her actions is variable, and determines the reliability of his or her performance (Hollnagel, 1998).
CREAM follows a classification scheme consisting of several groups that describe the error
modes of the erroneous actions. The classification scheme allows the analyst to define the links
between the causes and consequences of the error under analysis. However, CREAM has limited
application due to its meticulous procedure.
The interaction between humans and computers is the explicit analysis in TAFEI. This
interaction is modeled by mapping human activity onto computer states (Baber & Stanton,
1994). TAFEI comprises three principle components: Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), StateSpace Diagrams, and Transition Matrices. HTA provides a description of human activity; SSDs
provide a description of machine activity; and transition matrices provide a mechanism for
determining potential erroneous activity through the interaction of the human and the device
(Sears & Jacko, 2009). TAFEI works by identifying the possible shifts between the different
states of a device and uses the standard description of behavior to identify potential erroneous
actions. Whereas, TAFEI concentrates on modeling and evaluating human activity onto machine
states, HABIT emphasizes evaluating the effects that manifest as a result of the integration of
automation, concerning human behavior and performance.
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3.0 Methodology
The method of the design of the Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task
(HABIT) Analysis framework is outlined in Figure 8. A description of each stage is discussed in
the following sections.

Figure 8 Experimental methodology
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3.1 Development of the Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task (HABIT) Analysis
The development of the proposed framework was inspired by a lack of human-centric
system design in the HAI domain. Extensive Human Factors studies agree that increasing the
LOA can impair the operators’ situation awareness and cause OOTL performance problems
(Onnasch et al., 2014; Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010; Lee, 2006; Parasuraman et al., 1993). A
human-centered perspective is especially necessary in human-automation shared cognitive
functions, as interaction is critical to performance. This may be demonstrated as an increase in
recovery time or decision-making (Onnasch et al., 2014; Lorenz et al., 2001). Endsley and Kiris
(1995) claim that the majority of the problems associated with OOTL performance are due to a
loss of situation awareness. A loss of situation awareness impairs a human’s ability to perceive
elements in the environment within a period of time and space, comprehend the elements
meaning, and project the elements status in the near future (Endsley, 2017). Attention and
working memory are cited as critical factors limiting operators from acquiring and interpreting
information from the environment to form situation awareness, and mental models and goaldirected behavior are theorized as important mechanisms for overcoming these limits (Endsley,
1995).
As the OOTL performance problem is discussed in several human factors studies as the
source of system failures, to my knowledge no framework is established with the objective to
elicit insight to mitigate OOTL consequences in human-automated systems. The proposed
framework explores potential sources of OOTL performance problems by means of an
annotative approach applied to the model of the respective task. The factors attributed to a loss of
situation awareness are depicted in Figure 9.

39

Inadequate
Feedback

Loss of Situation Awareness

Overreliance

Complacency

Limitations
of
Cognitive
Control

Figure 9 Factors that are cited to contribute to OOTL performance problems. The
factors depicted can be influenced by one another, consequently resulting in compound
issues. To maintain situation awareness these constructs must be addressed.
OOTL performance does not explicitly result from function allocation by way of LOA,
but can result from a combination of the elements presented in the diagram above. Some of the
mentions may be interrelated, but may surface for different reasons and at different times. For
instance, compounding issues of vigilance and complacency can decrease attention allocation to
critical information as a result of increased trust in the automated aid (Moray, 2003; Lee & See,
2004; Hergeth et al., 2016). Pairing a computer with a human is complicated, as the behavior of a
human operator and automation contrast. While humans are a complex element to integrate into
a system due to inherent variability and adaptability, designing the human out-of-the-loop is not
the answer.
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Humans cannot properly contribute without situation awareness. Human error can occur
from a variety of influences, but the underlying cognitive processes that lead to error are
consistent. Reason’s (1990) error taxonomy and Rasmussen’s (1983) Skill-Rule-Knowledge
(SRK) model are incorporated in the proposed framework to aid in classifying functions as well
as human error. The integration of the two paradigms is summarized in Table 3. The SRK model
defines three levels of cognitive activity during task performance and decision-making. The three
levels require an increasing level of competency, attention, and cognition (Rasmussen, 1983).
The types of errors included in the table below correspond with the defined behaviors.
Table 3 Integration of the established work incorporated in the proposed framework

The proposed framework aims to elicit insight and detect potential HAI problems in the
system that mirror OOTL performance problems by way of modeling task behavior and applying
situational annotation. Problems associated with complacency have been attributed to the
tendency of human operators to over-trust automated systems (Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh,
1993; Wiener, 1985). In effect, complacency has been declared a major factor associated with
lack of vigilance in monitoring under automation (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). Annotation aligns
with the behavioral tendencies of the human operator with respect to how they perceive the
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automated aid, how they think at the different levels, in addition to the contemplation of human
limitations. A tradeoff diagram representative of situational HAIs depict the attentional concerns
to annotate. A guide is available for reference during the annotation phase of the analysis,
comprised of the tradeoffs diagram and an aggregate list of human limitations with respect to
cognition.
The framework renders a strategy to recognize, comprehend, and associate the behaviors
of interactions by means of investigating theorized erroneous behavior. According to Reason
(1990), there are three stages of cognitive processing for a task. Each cognitive stage has an
associated form of error. Table 4 outlines the cognitive processes and each stage’s associated
form of error.
Table 4 Cognitive processing stages and associates errors distilled from Reason (1990)

Information processing is integrated throughout the stages of cognitive processing.
Information processing requires the human operator to perceive information, transform that
information into different forms, take actions based on the perceived and transformed
information, and process the feedback from the implemented action in terms of its effect on the
environment (Wickens & Carswell, 2006). The quality of the information presented to the human
operator influences the operator’s situation awareness, which ultimately affects the efficiency of
human information processing and decision-making in human-automated systems. The
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conclusion that can be drawn from this is that situation awareness is pivotal to the success of
nearly every phase of system performance.

3.2 Framework Procedure
The success of the analysis is contingent on the analysts’ familiarity with the system
constructs. The analyst must be well informed on the task and agent roles, including:
a) Parameters, expectations, and demands of the task; in addition to the task goal,
which should be based on the human operators’ objective of the system (Weiner
& Curry, 1980).
b) Principal role of the automated and human operator with respect to contributing
to the achievement of the task goal.
The framework entails a top-down approach to recognizing trends by way of classifying the task
functions into levels of activity related to different levels of performance, providing a contextual
model of the system interactions. The procedure of the proposed framework is presented in
Figure 10.
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Figure 10 Procedure for the proposed framework intended to guide the modeling
and annotation of cognitive activity.
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Additional content to guide the annotation phase of the procedure is shown in Figure 11.
Humans are flexible and variable thinkers; however, humans are restricted in cognitive control.
To recognize the functions that require additional support or interaction, the limitations of human
cognitive control must be considered.

Figure 11 Procedure continued, Table adapted from Gazzaley and Rosen (2016)

Annotation is applied to elicit the situational behavior that may surface in each level of
cognition. Situational annotations are not limited to content provided in the guide. The
extensiveness of annotation is contingent upon the analyst’s objective, and the complexity of the
task.
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The segmented human action diagram (SHAD) is based on the work from the Rasmussen
(1983) on the levels of performance of human operations and Reason’s (1990) corresponding
error types. The SHAD illustrates a contextual model of the respective task. Interactions are
represented as the decisions the human must make in performing the task. Decision points are a
primary focus for the following steps, as failures and setbacks are often introduced here. The
SHAD offers insight on the cognitive demands of the respective task. The cognitive demands
and problem solving abilities required to make the decision or perform the task influence the
placement within the SHAD. Figure 12 shows the structure of the SHAD.

Figure 12 SHAD structure indicates the hierarchy of cognitive activity based on the
behavioral actions applied in each level. The functions associated to each level guide the
analyst in determining the nature of the respective task in terms of cognitive demands .
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The completed SHAD is used in the assessment of HAI in the respective task. HAI is
assessed by way how the human operator may perceive or interact with the automated aid. These
constructs are captured in the model by way of annotation. The proposed framework contains a
Failure Forms table to assist the analyst in categorizing the failure types for the respective task in
addition to predicting what could go wrong. The contents of the table are the generic human
failure types (Reason, 1990) in which are associated and categorized in terms of Rasmussen’s
(1983) classification of cognitive activity. This table serves as a reference this table to associate
potential errors with cognitive activity. The Failure Forms table is consistent with Table 5.
Table 5 Forms of failure and trends in the cognitive hierarchy.

The mediation of analysis output is concentrated not only the problematic interactions
that exist in the system, but considerably on the absence of pivotal system features that have
been recognized to explicitly augment human cognitive processing, for instance, feedback. The
distribution of activity is intended to illuminate the cognitive demands of the respective task.
Principles of cognitive limitations are meant to be reflected in the situational annotations. To
validate the proposed framework two Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance tasks were
assessed, each comprised of different cognitive demands and levels of automation.
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4.0 Experimental Use Case 1: Vigilance Task
For a use case, a vigilance task of a data-truthing operation is applied. Data-truthing is a
visual tracking task that required long periods of concentration. Truthing is typically a dull and
tedious process that strains the vigilance and moral of human image analysts (IA). Truthing
comprises of tracking and analyzing specified targets distributed in full motion imagery. Full
motion imagery is presented to the IA in the form of discrete images, or frames. The system
interface implements an indexing technique in the analysis of surveillance data, allowing the IA
to select a sequence, play it forward or backward and stop it at individual frames (Courtney,
1996). When human analysts derive information from this imagery, the IA must distinguish
targets from noise. The effort required to detect and analyze targets is contingent on the quality
of the imagery. In making the decision that a target is detected, human analysts tend to use
cognitive heuristics to reduce the cognitive effort. The desire to reduce cognitive effort stems
from humans’ cognitive control limitations. Utilization of these cognitive heuristics may lead to
potential biases and associated error (Fendley & Narayanan, 2012). For instance, memory biases
affect the accuracy of IAs in recalling, visualizing, and searching for targets. The conclusions
drawn from applying the HABIT analysis to the data-truthing task will be validated by means of
analyzing a collection of error records associated with the data-truthing operation (R, Myers &
C. Curtis, personal communication, November 2018).

4.1 Apparatus and Stimuli
The error records correspond with truthing performance of four Columbus Large Image
Format (CLIF) files (Rovito, 2018). The CLIF dataset was analyzed in the data-truthing task.
The imagery utilized in the respective data-truthing task was generated with AFRL Sensor
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Directorate’s WAMITT tool (Rovito, 2018). Table 6 outlines the imagery applied to the datatruthing task.
Table 6 CLIF data applied to truthing task and assessed.

In total, the CLIF dataset is comprised of 96,702 (16,117 images x 6 cameras) raw files
and 16,117 auxiliary text files (Davis, 2010). CLIF data collection involved building mounted
electro-optical cameras, millimeter wave infrared, Large Area Image Recorder, and an electrooptical camera on an UAV (Ling, Wu, Blasch, Chen, Lang, & Bai, 2011). The scene captured is
a flyover of the Ohio State University campus. The sensor is a large format monochromatic
electro-optical sensor comprised of a 2 by 3 matrix of six cameras (Rovito, 2018). Cameras 3, 1,
and 5 make-up the top row of the image, and cameras 2, 0, and 4 make-up the bottom row of the
image (Davis, 2010). Each camera was oriented to maximize coverage, yet allow enough overlap
between images to help in mosaicking the image to form a larger image (Davis, 2010).
Mosaicking is the stitching-together of the images from the six cameras using both computer
vision and photogrammetric approaches (Rovito, 2018). Figure 13 shows a sample of the CLIF
imagery as well as offers insight on the orientation and mosaicking of the six cameras.
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Figure 13 Sample image of AFRL CLIF 2007 dataset over Ohio State
University. The orientation of the cameras (1-6) as well as the
boundary of the discrete imagery is depicted (Rivoto, 2018).

The cameras for this data collection capture imagery at approximately 2-frames per
second (Rovito, 2018). The low frame rate makes the trajectory prediction very difficult. Fast
camera motion is a result of the aircraft flying, which complicates background modeling and
causes radical camera motion (Ling et al., 2011). The technique employed in the collection of
large format imagery can complicate the data-truthing process by way of two fundamental
factors: the low frame rate and the radical camera motion. The low frame rate often causes a
large target jump across frames, which in turn increases the uncertainty in the prediction of target
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location. The radical camera motion further intensifies the problem. These two factors can cause
discontinuity in target appearance across frames. In addition to low frame rate and camera
movement, the general challenges with using the large format imagery include:
a) Environmental effects (i.e., shade, illumination)
b) Varying viewpoints,
c) Adjacent clutter comprised of similar objects (i.e., vehicles),
d) Background clutter,
e) Image contrast between the object and the background,
f) Environmental occlusions (i.e., building, tree, overpass), and
g) Tracking between image boundaries.
These challenges often simultaneously exist, which can introduce added complications to
employing traditional visual tracking algorithms to aid the IA. For the respective truthing task, an
algorithm is applied to aid in tracking the target. The integrated aid interpolates points between
the IAs manual points, but always in a straight line. The IA has the option to frame-advance up
to ten frames at a time, maximizing the utilization of the interpolation tool. When an object
deviates from moving in a straight line, the analyst must intervene and supplement the tracking
of the target with manual points, to ensure the truth is an accurate representation of the target’s
path. Improper utilization of the frame-advance feature can cause errors in the truthing data, as
the functionality of the truthing aid is limited. Figure 14 demonstrates a scenario in which human
intervention is required. A right-click of the computer mouse inserts a manual point. The manual
point must be placed in the center of the object to ensure quality truthing.
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Figure 14 Human intervention scenario in data-truthing tasks showing the progression of a
moving target. Interpolation upholds up until the transition from point three to point
four. When the vehicle turns (i.e., is no longer moving in a straight line), the Image
Analyst must input manual truthing points to track the movement of the target.

4.2 Experimental Task: Data-Truthing Task
Data-truthing is a tedious process requiring the manual labeling of data by an IA. Long
periods of concentration and vigilance is critical to truthing performance. The goal of the datatruthing task is to accurately truth specified objects, referred to in this case as targets. The
intelligence requirements were predetermined and disclosed to the IA in truthing instructions.
The human analyst is responsible for truthing all vehicles and/or dismounts (i.e., pedestrians).
These targets are tracked by direct observation or indirectly by inference, such as determining
where the object was when exiting direct view. The task environment involves multiple analysts
working on different segments of the same dataset. The IA is instructed to start truthing as soon
as the target appears in the data to avoid confusion with other image analyst’s truthing the same
object. The objective of the truthing task requires:
1. Targets be tracked from start (i.e., as soon as the target appears in the data) to end
(i.e., as soon as the target exits the data)
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2. Analysis of EEIs from start to end.
EEIs are the target’s appearance and operating conditions (OCs). Truthing instructions
for the task emphasize the importance of verifying the respective target’s OCs. Depending on the
properties of the imagery (i.e., high/low contrast, clutter, occlusions, etc.), the processing
demands may vary. To emphasize the convolution of the CLIF imagery, Table 7 contains a count
of a variety of objects that were truthed by IAs.
Table 7 Truthing statistics of the CLIF dataset
Total count of…
…im ages w ith at least one truth object
...objects truthed

6,343
3,502,401

Count of each object type:
SUV

287,348

SUV w / trailer

965

animal

666

bag
bicycle
boat

385
7,749
25

box truck

10,330

bus

13,568

dismount
dump truck
flatbed truck
flatbed truck w / trailer
motorcycle
other
pickup truck

901,811
466
11,907
681
2,463
38,372
113,836

pickup truck w / trailer

5,977

plane

3,548

sedan

2,008,068

sedan w / trailer

1,551

semi

6,155

semi w / trailer

4,876

trashcan

56

utility pole

33

van
van w / trailer

81,331
234
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The target’s appearance is representative of what the IA can visually perceive from the imagery,
such as color and classification (i.e., car, plane, boat, helicopter, motorcycle); and in some
instances, by vehicle type (i.e., sedan, SUV, van, pick-up truck, box truck, semi-truck). Table 8
outlines operating conditions the IA must analyze.
Table 8 Operating conditions the human analyst must assess in the data-truthing task

4.3 Framework Application and Validation
The automated aid applied to the data-truthing task serves to enhance effectiveness of
target tracking by interpolating points between manual truths. The frame-advance feature permits
the human analyst to advance multiple frames at a time, in turn introduces more interpolation.
The IA’s incentive to utilize interpolation may stem from a desire to speed up the tedious
truthing process. This notion results in a tradeoff with respect to frame-advance rate and stimuli
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perceived by the human analyst. For example, a high frame-advance rate yields fewer imagery
perceived by the human analyst. The HABIT framework is applied to assess human-automation
interaction to predict human error in the data-truthing task. The task objective as well as the
primary role of the human analyst and the automated aid is outlined in Table 9.
Table 9 Outlines the task objective and primary function allocations

Human-automation interaction is minimal in the truthing task. The image analyst and automated
aid operate independent of one another. The human analyst controls the frame-advance rate,
which in turn affects the utilization of the automated aid (i.e., interpolation). The cognitive
activities that comprise the data-truthing task are modeled in the segmented human action
diagram shown in Figure 15. Succeeding the construction of the human action diagram (SHAD),
situational annotation is implemented to reflect the limitations of human cognitive control that
are associated with the cognitive demands of respective task functions. The annotated model is
shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 15 Represents the distribution of the cognitive activities that comprise the aggregate truthing task.
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Figure 16 Situational annotations aid in eliciting insight on the HAI problems concerning the lack of cognitive support for the human
analyst.

The segmented human action diagram (SHAD) indicates that the majority of truthing
functions can be classified as skill-based. This indication is valid as the data-truthing process is
a, highly-routine task. In effect, maintaining vigilance is pivotal to performance. The
characteristics of this task may influence how the image analyst (IA) perceives, and interacts
with the system, as human’s have a limited ability to maintain vigilance over an extended period.
Annotations in the skill-based level are associated with attention-based cognitive limitations.
Rule-based activities are annotated with respect to the human analyst’s cognitive control of his or
her working memory in terms of capacity and fidelity. The criticality of cognitive construct is
due to the influence vigilance has on the IAs ability to recall if the essential elements of
information (EEIs) have changed. In the event of a vigilance decrement, the human operator’s
attention is diverted, which can result in action errors, such as slips (i.e., attention-based) and
lapses (i.e., memory-based). Perception blocks are most pivotal in the knowledge-based
cognitive activities, as the human must make critical decisions that influence the performance of
the truthing task. In particular, determining the appearance and operating condition of targets
may introduce disparity. In addition to the perceptual blocks, the high-level cognitive activities
are susceptible to the introduction of cognitive heuristics, and in turn cognitive bias. For
instance, there is room for assumption with respect to the location of the target whereas the
human analyst must continue to either search the image or simply conclude that the target has
left the frame-of-view. Due to human’s behavioral tendencies, concluding the target is no longer
in view and ending the track may be perceived as a shortcut for the analyst.
As a result of the low-level cognitive engagement in the data-truthing task. It is
anticipated that skill-based errors relative to updating EEIs ensue; particularly lapses, due to a
vigilance decrement. Compounding issues may arise with respect to assessing the EEIs. The
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analysts working memory, vigilance, and perception plays an important role in ensuring EEIs are
updated correctly. The human analyst must remain cognizant of the appearance and operating
conditions frame-by-frame. These cognitive elements are indicative of the human analyst’s
truthing performance. No system support is offered to the analyst in an attempt to maintain
vigilance. As this is a vigilance task and human concentration and attention diminishes quickly,
it is anticipated that the lack of system support and highly routine characteristics may yield
human action errors.
The error records provided were assessed to evaluate the validity of the HABIT
framework. The error records were generated from a 10-minute truthing summary and a 2-hour
truthing summary. Human error as well as the utilization of the aid were examined for both
truthing summaries. Error count in terms of omission and commission is visualized in Figure 17.
Utilization of the automated aid is shown in Figure 18.

Figure 17 The count of truthing errors for both cases denoted
as omission and commission failures.
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Figure 18 The count of interpolated tracking points is
representative of the utilization of the tracking algorithm.

Figure 18 shows the utilization of the interpolation aid was much higher in the 2-hour
truth summary than the 10-minute truth summary, whereas no interpolation points were
recorded. The surge of omission errors in the 2-hour truth summary were explored with respect
to the defined frame sequence. Figure 19 illustrates the distribution of commission and omission
errors over time.

Figure 19 Sequence of truthing errors in the 2-hour case shows the distribution of omission and
commission errors over time
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As revealed in the figure above, the human analyst committed consecutive omission
errors in the final stretch of truthing. The data also seems to depict that approximately halfway
through the truthing task the error rate escalates for both omission and commission errors. To
mitigate omission error, a form of system support should be integrated into the system to
maintain human motivation and attention. This may be in the form of performance or
motivational feedback.
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5.0 Experimental Use Case 2: Multi-Tasking Mission
For a second use case, a multi-tasking mission of multi-UAV control and surveillance is
applied. The single-operator-multiple UAV paradigm is exercised in this task, where the human
operator is responsible for supervising the activity of multiple UAVs; in addition to performing
intermittent surveillance tasks. Dissimilar from the vigilance task, this use case implicates multiattentional demands in a time-critical setting. Applying HABIT to this task is an initial indication
of the scalability of the proposed framework. The demands associated with multi-tasking exploit
the following cognitive skills:
a) Attentional control
b) Working memory
c) Time-critical decision-making
In controlling multiple UAVs, humans perform tasks related to the overall mission and
payload management and delegate navigation and motion control tasks to automation.
Performance data collected from a multi-UAV control and surveillance task was used in the
validation of HABIT (Panganiban, Long, Matthews, & Schwing, in prep). Data from four
subjects was analyzed. The subject group consisted of two females and two males ranging from
20-26 years. The data was collected at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and by the Trust in
Augmentation Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory of Airman Systems.

5.1 Apparatus and Stimuli
The ISR task simulates a multi-UAV control and surveillance mission. A rule-based
navigation algorithm termed Reconnaissance Environmental for Swarm Control of Highly
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autonomous Unmanned vehicles (RESCHU) assists in the navigation and motion control of the
swarm vehicles. RESCHU generates the path plans of the UAVs and interfaces with the user via
prompts regarding time-critical UAV activity. The human operator uses the UAVs to survey
areas of interest (AOI). Wide area motion imagery displays an aerial-view of the AOI.
Surveillance of the target areas is performed in the “payload window”. Each target area contains
an object of interest. Four vehicles navigate throughout the map to accessible AOIs. Access to
target areas is configured so that red targets are accessible only by odd-numbered UAVs and
gray targets were accessible only by even-numbered UAVs. This parameter forces human
operators to exercise cognitive control when deciding where to assign a UAV. When an UAV
successfully arrives at a target area, the search objective is communicated to the operator via the
“message box”. The contents of the map include:
a) 4 UAVs,
b) 14 target areas, and
c) 20 hazards.
The target areas appear for a limited time, similar to true ISR, where an AOI may become a nofly zone. A countdown is displayed below each target area, depicting the time-to-expiration. Of
the hazards in the map, 50% are hidden. This obstacle is challenging in that the hazard zones
expire randomly and resurface in new locations. Auditory alerts inform the human operator when
an UAV intersects with a hazard zone or arrives at a target area. The human operator controls the
mode of operation (i.e., manual or automated), comparable to the function allocation scheme of
adaptable automation. In manual mode, RESCHU is off and the human operator is responsible
for performing all task functions, inclusive of multi-UAV control and surveillance. RESCHU is
employed in automated mode, making multi-UAV control a supervisory control task for the
63

human operator. The system interface is contingent on the mode of operation. While the majority
of the display is identical, the decision aid changes. Manual mode presents insightful information
to the human operator regarding UAV arrival rate in the form of a timeline. Automated mode
incorporates human-automation interaction by way of RESCHU prompts. Figure 20 illustrates
the change in display in terms of the utilization of RESCHU.

Figure 20 System display of the multi-UAV control and surveillance simulation
interfacing the human operator and the automated aid.

5.2 Experimental Task: Multi-UAV Control and Surveillance Task
The ISR mission objective is to identify as many objects of interest possible in the time
allotted. Individuals at a remote intelligence center dictate the object of interest. The human
operator serves as a sensor operator. As a sensor operator, the user is to work with the sensor
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capabilities of the autonomously controlled swarm vehicles. The functionality of the system is a
function of the operating mode. Figure 21 depicts the functions in sequential order. Despite the
correctness of the surveillance task, the UAV is immediately assigned to new target.

Figure 21 Key functions that comprise the multi-attentional task

In pursuit of maximizing the objects of interest detected, the sensor operator must be
mindful of the hazards. These hazards can be avoided by creating a route with waypoints around
the hazard or changing the goal of the respective UAV. Table 10 frames system functions as well
as the forms of automated aids available to the human operator.
Table 10 Outlines the system function and the forms of aid

RESCHU assists the sensor operator by piloting the UAVs. When performing
surveillance, the sensor operator’s attention is allocated to the payload window— away from the
activity in the map. Automated aids communicate UAV activity by way of auditory alerts and
RESCHU prompts. These aids serve as a form of feedback to maintain the operator’s awareness.
In the event that human intervention is needed, the sensor operator must regain awareness of the
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system state and act quickly to resolve any impending issues. Figure 22 displays a mockup of a
task scenario and the associated RESCHU prompt.

The task scenario modelled in Figure 22 portrays system activity when an UAV is approaching a
hazard. In this case, the prompt appears in the bottom left corner of the screen with three options
for the operator to consider. The operator may choose to ignore the warning, assuming it is a
false alarm. Otherwise, the operator can choose to avoid the hazard, thus instructing RESCHU to
set a waypoint around the hazard zone. The last option is to select reassign, in which the
operating mode shifts the UAV into manual, allowing the operator to set waypoint(s) or a new
destination. The proposed Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task analysis is applied to
the multi-UAV control and surveillance task to deliver insight on the decisions made and actions
performed by the sensor operator. Human-automation interactions are considered in the model to
assess how the human perceived the automated aid. Performance data was analyzed in terms of
operating mode to distinguish system performance as a function of function allocation.

5.3 Framework Application and Validation
Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task (HABIT) analysis framework guides the
modeling of the decisions and actions that comprise the cognitive activities in the multi-tasking
operation in pursuit of predicting human error. The decisions and actions are allocated between
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the human operator and the automated aid. Table 11 outlines the task objective and function
allocation.
Table 11 Task objective and primary function allocations

In controlling multiple UAVs, humans generally perform tasks related to the overall mission and
payload management and delegate navigation and motion control tasks to automation.
Delegation of motion control does not mean the human operator’s exclusive role is to perform
surveillance; rather, the sensor operator must distribute his or her attention to concurrently,
supervise multi-UAV motion control. System support, in the form of auditory alerts and system
prompts, is incorporated to communicate UAV activity. The dynamic of the human operator and
automated aid is modelled in the segmented human action diagram shown in Figure 23. Sound
icons represent events in which auditory alerts are sounded. Figure 24 displays the annotated
model of the multi-UAV control and surveillance task.
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Figure 22 Represents the distribution of the cognitive activities that comprise the aggregate truthing task.
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Figure 23 Situational annotations aid in eliciting insight on the HAI problems concerning the limitations of human
cognitive control in multi-attentional tasks.

The dynamic of the single-operator-multi-UAV paradigm strains multiple aspects of
human cognitive control. Situation awareness can be lost when multi-tasking as a result of a
human’s inability to effectively process two attention-demanding tasks at once; for instance,
multi-UAV control and surveillance. Task switching between the supervisory task and
surveillance task is illustrated by the spread in the distribution of cognitive activities (see Figure
23). This construct is rational, as the surveillance task requires a higher degree cognitive
engagement whereas the supervisory task requires monitoring, in turn a low degree of cognitive
engagement. Performance of this low degree of cognitive engagement is noted in Figure 24 as
out-of-the-loop (OOTL) performance, which is known to ensue numerous consequences as a
result of impaired situation awareness. Limitations pertaining to operator attention are recurring
notations in Figure 24; such as, diverted attention from UAV activity during surveillance; and
distributed attention during the supervisory task as well as the entirety of the mission. The
exploitation of these cognitive limitations affect the higher level cognitive activities, as situation
awareness is necessary for making strategic, time-critical decisions. Based on the deductions
made in terms of the cognitive demands of the task, the time-element as well as the multi-tasking
and task switching performed may result in compound issues related to OOTL performance.
Reducing operator awareness results in costs to performance in terms of accuracy and speed,
both critical performance metrics of this task. Erroneous action is most likely to occur under
automated operation of motion control task due to impaired situation awareness or complacency.
Whereas human perception was exercised in surveying the target areas, it was not strained. It is
probable that the time-critical demands contribute to the incident of any surveillance errors.
The allocation of motion control to the automated aid is inevitable, as the human is
incapable of effectively performing all functions of the task in the time allotted. Whereas aid is
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in place to alert the sensor operator of hazard interactions and UAV engagements, introducing
additional aid to supplement the human’s mental model of the system may improve the sensor
operator’s reaction time as well as alleviate time-pressure in aggregate.
Performance data (Panganiban et al., in prep) was analyzed to evaluate the validity of the
constructed and annotated human action diagram. Analysis of human-automation interaction was
based on the utilization of the automated aid (i.e., RESCHU) and the operator’s responses to
system prompts. Utilization of the automated aid is represented by the percentage of automated
events carried out in the respective task. Operator’s responses to system prompt provides a
degree of insight into the human operator’s trust in the automated aid. For instance, choosing to
ignore the warning may indicate a lack of trust in the system; choosing to avoid the hazard,
instructs the motion control aid to set a waypoint around the hazard zone, moreover showing
trust; or selecting reassign may indicate a lack of user-acceptance, as this yields a shift to manual
mode. The distributions of the four, sensor operator’s responses are shown in Figure 25

Figure 24 Sensor operator responses to system prompts indicate the operator’s acceptance as
well as trust in the automated aid.
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Corresponding to the task objective, the number of correct targets identified as well as
surveillance accuracy is indicative of overall mission performance. The surveillance accuracy is
the ratio of the correct targets detected to the total targets detected. Utilization of the automated
aid and mission scores did not vary significantly among subjects. Figure 26 summarized the
overall mission performance of the four sensor operator’s.

Figure 25 The objective of the task is influences by the amount of
correct targets identified. The utilization represents the employment of
the automated aid used by the respective sensor operator. This data is
representative of the sensor operators overall mission performance.

The interactions and overall mission performance metrics indicate the effectiveness of the
actions of the human operator. An analysis of erroneous actions delve into the ineffective actions
performed by the human operator as well as provide insight on the validity of HABIT analysis
deductions. Erroneous action assessed include:
a) Hazard intersections,
b) Damage count,
c) Incorrect UAV assignments, and
d) Incorrect target detection.
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A summary of the sensor operator error with respect to incorrect target detection, damage count,
and access error is shown in Figure 27. Access error represents the event in which a sensor
operator assigns a UAV to an incorrect target area.

Figure 26 Erroneous actions of sensor operators are observed in both the
motion control and surveillance tasks. The performance data displayed
summarized the forms of human error executed in each mission.

The performance data in Figure 27 indicate that erroneous behavior is more often shown in the
form of UAV damage or poor surveillance, than the assignment of UAV destinations. Actions
pertaining to these failures are explored as a function of game time as well as operating.
Time-pressure was predicted to contribute to error in the surveillance task. Surveillance
time was assessed based on the outcome of the task, correct target or incorrect target. A box plot
is shown in Figure 28 displays the distribution of time among correct targets and incorrect targets
within the payload. On average, shorter amounts of time were experienced in payloads that
resulted in a correct target. On the contrary, longer amounts of time were experienced in
payloads that resulted in an incorrect target.
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Figure 27 Distribution of the time spent in payloads show a
distinction in terms of search time and correct targets, and
search time and incorrect targets.

This time construct was observed in all four missions. In each operation, the surveillance time
that resulted in correct targets was less than the surveillance time that resulted in incorrect
targets. This trend supports the deduction posed in the HABIT analysis. Time-pressure is
intensified as time passes by, especially in time-critical scenarios, which explains the incidence
of incorrect targets being detected in longer surveillance periods.
The damage collected was analyzed with respect to the mode of operation. Figure 29
shows the distribution of damage counts for each sensor operator in terms of operating mode.
Automated operation yielded a higher damage count than manual operation for three out of four
missions, but not by much. To investigate this construct, hazard intersections were analyzed as a
function of game time. The mode of operation was also considered. The hazard intersections
throughout each mission are shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 29 Motion control error associated with the mode of operation in each mission
displays a higher rate of error in automated operation for three of the four
operations.

Figure 28 Hazard intersections throughout each mission in terms of operating mode
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In Figure 30, it is evident that that automated operation not only yields more hazard intersections
but also more severe damage as demonstrated by the peaks of intersections. Data supporting this
claim is shown in Table 12. The damage level is associated with the severity of the intersection
with the hazard. As shown in Table 12, this metric is significantly larger than the average
damage level associated with manual operation.
Table 12 Damage statistics generated from the four missions

Based on the performance data there is no distinct indication that either operating mode
significantly influenced erroneous behavior. However, patterns in the data with respect to
incorrect targets and surveillance times as well as damage levels in automated operation align
with the predictions posed in the HABIT model. The task switching and multi-talking functions
of the task reduce operator awareness in virtually all aspects of the task and in turn adversely
affect performance in terms of accuracy and speed. The time-pressure pattern observed in
surveillance errors as well as the surge of damage levels in automated operation are indicative of
the speed and accuracy costs.
The alerts and system prompts maintain the operator’s situation awareness to some
degree. The system feedback once the operator is notified that intervention may be needed is
negligible. It is necessary that the critical information pertaining to the system state must be
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shared with the human operator before any decision or action can be taken. To ensure critical
information is shared with the operator, information should be systemically communicated
throughout the task so that in the event human intervention is required, the human operator has
a complete mental model of the system and can make prompt, strategic decisions.
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6.0 Discussion
This approach recognizes that the human cognitive processes required at different levels
of performance as well as how the human operator perceives the automated aid drive human
action. The Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task (HABIT) Analysis framework
models the distribution of cognitive activities in terms skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based
behavior to assess human-automation interaction in pursuit of proactively identifying and
addressing problems by supporting the human-automated system in order to augment both the
human operator and the automated aid. Cognitive demands are inferred based on the
characteristics of the cognitive activity. Limitations of human cognitive control are considered in
the analysis— not to devalue the human, but to recognize the task functions that require
additional support. The novel framework was designed to be applied before a human-automated
system is fielded. However, in view of HABIT’s scalability, the framework can be applied at any
moment HAI problems are identified or suspected.
Error identification and management are critical features for effective system design.
Operator situation awareness is a key cognitive construct in a human’s ability to resolve system
failures, as impaired situation awareness can affect the human operator’s vigilance, as well as
rate-of-response and decision-making. High levels of automation can generally be applied to
skill-based behavior (i.e., well-defined, highly structured operation), both replacing and
supporting rule- and knowledge-based behavior (i.e., unstructured domain). The question of how
control and information is shared across cognitive activities is central to understanding the
planning of human action, with levels of cognitive control. System success is contingent on the
notion that the human operator and automated aid are mutually aware of the system states and
task objectives at all times to ensure plausible actions and decisions are carried out. The absence
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of this construct generally results in OOTL consequences, where the human operator’s situation
awareness is impaired due to extensive monitoring or highly routine tasks. The HABIT
framework addresses OOTL performance consequences as a principal indicator of human error.
Analysis of the two ISR use cases exhibited that the distribution of cognitive activity is
indicative of the human operator’s actions— substantiated as well as erroneous actions. For both
cases, the HABIT framework successfully guided the modeling of the cognitive activities. The
task schemes of both ISR tasks were effectively demonstrated in the segmented human action
diagram. This model of the data-truthing task illustrated the consecutive skill-based tasks which
require a low degree of cognitive engagement and competency, indicative of a highly routine
task. The human action diagram of the multi-UAV control and surveillance task, illustrated task
switching between the supervisory motion control task and the surveillance task, shown by the
spread of the cognitive tasks among skill- and knowledge-based functions. This suggests that the
segmented human action diagram successfully captures the cognitive demands of the respective
tasks. Situational annotations pertaining to human limitations of cognitive control are worth
discussing as these cast light on human-automation interaction (HAI) deficits. HAI deficits were
observed in the data-truthing task, as an ineffective integration of HAI yields inadequate support
for the human operator as well as the automated aid; while the multi-control and surveillance
task encountered HAI deficits as a result of cognitive overload due to multi-attentional demands
imposed on the human operator. Whereas most predictions determined from the HABIT analysis
were shown to be valid assumptions, limitations were identified in the proposed framework,
which can be addressed in future work. Table 13 summarizes the findings and validity of each
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annotation posed for both use cases.

Vigilance was proven a critical problem in the data-truthing task. The finding of
consecutive omission errors at the end of the 2-hour truth summary indicated a vigilance
Table 13 Findings and validity of the guided model as well as predicted erroneous action

decrement. Human concentration and attention is necessary for effective data-truthing.
Systematic performance feedback and/or motivational feedback is recommended to improve
vigilance performance.
Despite the automated aids that were employed to aid the operator in supervising UAV
motion control, the aids in place did not effectively support the human operator in time-critical
functions (i.e., incorrect targets) or in the event of system disturbances (i.e., hazard intersections,
damage). To improve accuracy and efficiency, high-priority feedback should be presented to the
human operator in the event of task switches. This allows the human operator to maintain their
mental model of the system state and set short-term goals for immediate action.

6.1 Limitations and Future Work
Overall, the results demonstrate an optimistic scalability of the novel framework.
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Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task (HABIT) Analysis effectively guided the
modeling and annotation of the cognitive activities of both use cases as well as successfully
predicted erroneous actions. The application of HABIT highlights the significance of each
component in the systemic method to predict human error and ameliorate human-automation
interaction. To ensure constructive results in future analyses, it is instrumental that the analyst is
well informed of the parameters, demands, function allocation, and objective(s) of the humanautomated task before applying the HABIT framework as well as throughout the analysis. If
fundamental tasks characteristics are misunderstood or disregarded, analysis output would in
turn, not fulfill the function of the HABIT framework.
As this work focused primarily on the identification of human error in human-automated
interaction, future research on the integration of human and automation may extend the
capabilities of the HABIT framework. Future work is necessary to validate appropriate design
recommendations across the levels of cognitive activities. This work would be useful in
providing design alternative to the systems engineer. Looking forward, expanding upon the
proposed Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task Analysis could prove quite beneficial
to the design of human-automation interaction.
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8.0 Appendix
List of Acronyms
AFRL: Air Force Research Laboratory
DAGSI: Defense Associated Graduate Student Innovators
HABIT: Human-Automation Behavioral Interaction Task Analysis
HAI: Human-Automation Interaction
LOA: Level of Automation
HITL: Human-in-the-Loop
ML: Machine Learning
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ISR: Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance
OOTL: Out-of-the-Loop
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